āmil, devoted also to the poets "from the time of al-Farazdaḳ down to our own day" and to the *ʿulamāʾ* of Baḥrayn; it has been further enriched recently by the *Takmilat Amal al-āmil* by the *sayyid* Ḥusayn Ṣadr al-Dīn. Among the numerous works of *shaykh* al-Ḥurr (who was quite prepared to collect the *ḥadīths* of the *Ahl al-Sunna*) there is also a *dīwān* of 20,000 verses, according to his contemporary, the *sayyid* ʿAlī Khān Madanī Shīrāzī in his *Sulāfat al-ʿaṣr*.

Bibliography: Muḥammad Bāḳir al-Khwānsārī, *Rawḍat al-djannāt*, Tehrān 1306, 544-6 (= 644-6); Mīrzā Muḥammad Tanukābunī, *Ḳiṣaṣ al-ʿulamāʾ*, Tehrān n.d., 289-93; Āḳā Buzurg Ṭihrānī, *al-Dharīʿa ilā taṣānīf al-Shīʿa*, ii, Nadjaf 1355, n. 129 and iii, Nadjaf 1357, n. 393; idem, *Muṣaffa 'l-maḳāl fī muṣannifī ʿilm al-ridjāl*, Tehrān 1378, cols. 401-2; Muḥammad ʿAlī Tabrīzī Khiyābānī (*Mudarris*), *Rayḥānat al-adab fī tarādjim al-maʿrūfīn bi 'l-kunya wa 'l-laḳab*, i, Tehrān 1366, 315-6; Muḥsin al-Amīn al-ʿĀmilī, *Aʿyān al-shīʿa*, xliv, 52-64. (G. SCARCIA)

ḤURRIYYA, "freedom," an abstract formation derived from *ḥurr* "free" corresponding to Hebrew *ḥōr*, Aram. *ḥēr* (*ḥerūṯā*), widely used also in Muslim languages other than Arabic. Already in pre-Islamic times, "free" was known not only as a legal term denoting the opposite of "unfree, slave" (*ʿabd* [*q.v.*]) but also as an ethical term denoting those "noble" of character and behavior. The legal concept of "freedom" continued to be used as a matter of course by Muslim jurists, who were inclined to give preference to the presumption of a free status for individuals in doubtful cases [see ʿABD] but otherwise accepted the existence of slavery and the deprivation of a section of humanity of their freedom without questioning, at least openly, the moral foundations. In the ethical sense, the superiority of the *ḥurr*, showing in his gentlemanly behavior, his generosity, his readiness to suffer for a noble cause, was constantly extolled in poetry and prose. The Greco-Arabic translation literature introduced the Muslims to some sayings illustrating Greek thinking on the problem of freedom; at the same time, it helped to reinforce the equation of "free" and "noble" and added some confusion of its own through the use of *ḥurriyya* to translate *eleutheriotēs* "generosity" in the Aristotelian canon of virtues. Furthermore, the writings of philosophers such as al-Fārābī and Ibn Rushd took some limited cognizance of "freedom" as a political term. In Muslim metaphysical speculation, *ḥurriyya* came to occupy a rather significant position through Ṣūfism. It appears as one of the guideposts on the mystic path in the *Lumaʿ* of al-Sarrādj and in the *Risāla* of his successor al-Ḳushayrī. Through the *Risāla* in particular, it gained a firm place in Ṣūfī literature. For the mystic, "freedom" is basically the freedom from everything except God and the devotion to Him. It is the recognition of the essential relationship between God the master and His human slaves who are completely dependent on Him, "freedom," as Ibn ʿArabī expresses it, "being perfect slavery" (*al-Iʿlām bi-ishārāt ahl al-ilhām*, Ḥaydarābād 1362, 8). However, one also hears about the existence of men who defended the necessity of "absolute freedom" (O. Pretzl, *Die Streitschrift des Ġazālī gegen die Ibāḥīja*, in *SBBayer. Ak.* 1933, text 27 f., trans. 51).

Ḥurriyya, although much discussed, did not achieve the status of a fundamental political concept that could have served as a rallying cry for great causes. Only this much can be stated with assurance. Beyond it, any evaluation of the situation prevailing in mediaeval Islam with regard to "freedom," in the way in which the term is generally if loosely used in the contemporary West, depends on the particular view one holds of "freedom" and the definition one chooses to give to the concept. Obviously, the actual situation varied greatly over the vast expanse of Muslim history, but some basic lines may be said to define the general picture: The individual Muslim was expected to consider subordination of his own freedom to the beliefs, morality, and customs of the group as the only proper course of behaviour. While he valued his personal freedom and was proud of it, he was not supposed to see in it a good to be defended at all costs against group demands. Politically, the individual was not expected to exercise any free choice as to how he wished to be governed. At times, he did stress his right to be considered and treated as an equal by the men in power. Under special circumstances, there was extensive community participation in the government (as, for instance, in early Islam or among certain sectarians), or, at least, a certain degree of wider distribution of the political power among the population (as, perhaps, in city states such as Seville). In general, however, governmental authority admitted of no participation of the individual as such, who therefore did not possess any real freedom vis-à-vis it. On the metaphysical level, the question of how much freedom could be vouchsafed to human beings in view of the omnipotence of God has occupied the Muslim mind from the very beginnings of Islam [see IKHTIYĀR]. Whatever concessions were made, however, were not made in the name of any kind of individual freedom, but in order to assure a better regulated society. Moreover, the widely adopted Ashʿarī solution of the free will dilemma, no less than all the others, was far too subtle for the masses to understand; at any rate it failed to impress them with the importance of the element of human freedom it contained.

Bibliography: F. Rosenthal, *The Muslim concept of freedom*, Leiden 1960. For modern Muslim works on freedom which also pay some attention to the historical background, see the bibliography to the following section.

(F. ROSENTHAL)

ii.—MODERN PERIOD

The Ottoman Empire and after. The first examples of the use of the word freedom in a clearly defined political sense come from late 18th century Turkey. The word used is not *hurriyya* but *serbestiyyet* (later also *serbestī*), pseudo-Arabic and pseudo-Persian abstracts from *serbest*, an established Ottoman term connoting the absence of limitations or restrictions (thus, *serbest tīmār* means a fief in which all the revenues go to the timariot, as against an ordinary *tīmār* in which certain revenues are reserved to the imperial exchequer [see TĪMĀR]). In its first known appearance in an official document, the word *serbestiyyet* denotes collective rather than personal freedom—*i.e.*, independence rather than liberty in the classical liberal sense. This is in the third article of the treaty of Küčük Kaynardja [*q.v.*] (1774), establishing the short-lived independence of the Crimean Tatars from both Turkey and Russia. The two states agree to recognize the Tatars as "free and entirely independent of any foreign power"; the Sultan is regarded as their religious head, "but without thereby compromising their political and civil liberty as established". The forms of words in the Italian original

of the treaty for these two phrases are "liberi, immediati, ed independenti assolutamente da qualunque straniera Potenza" and "senza pero mettere in compromesso la stabilita libertà loro politica e civile"; this is rendered in Turkish as *serbestiyyet we ghayr-i taʿalluḳ mustaḳill wudjūhla edjnebī bir dewlete tābiʿ olmamak üzre* . . . and *ʿaḳd olunan serbestiyyet-i dewlet we memleketlerine ḫalel getirmiyerek* (Turkish text in Djewdet, *Taʾrīḫ*[1], i, 358-9; *Medjmūʿa-i muʿāhedāt*, iii, 254; Italian in G. F. de Martens, *Recueil des traités* . . ., iv, Göttingen 1795, 610-2).

The French Revolution gave the word *serbestiyyet* a new meaning. Moralī El-Seyyid ʿAlī Efendi, the Ottoman ambassador in Paris under the *Directoire*, uses it several times in his *sefāretnāme* to translate *liberté*, chiefly in relation to symbols and ceremonies (*e.g.*, *TOEM*, no. 23 (1329 A.H.), 1458, 1460. On the display of the 'symbols' of freedom by Frenchmen in Turkey, see Djewdet, *Taʾrīḫ*[3], vi, 182-3). The *Reʾīs al-Kuttāb* ʿĀṭif Efendi, in his memorandum of 1798 on the political situation resulting from the activities of revolutionary France, shows a clearer understanding of the new political content of the term, and of the danger that it represented to the established order, in the Ottoman Empire as elsewhere. In his introductory account of the Revolution, he tells how the revolutionaries had enticed the common people (*ʿawāmm-i nās*) to follow them with promises of equality and freedom (*müsāwāt we serbestiyyet*) as a means of obtaining complete happiness in this world. More specifically, he is alarmed by the actions of the French in the former Venetian possessions which they had acquired—the Ionian islands and four towns on the mainland. By evoking the forms of the government of the ancient Greeks and installing a form of liberty (*serbestiyyet*), the French had made clear their hostile intentions (Djewdet, *Taʾrīḫ*[3], vi, 395, 400; cf. B. Lewis in *J. Wld.Hist.*, i (1953), 120 ff. (revised version in G. S. Métraux and F. Croizet, eds., *The new Asia*, New York-London 1965, 47 ff.), and *Slavonic Review*, xxxiv (1955), 234-5).

Before the end of the year the French had landed in Egypt, where General Bonaparte, on arrival, addressed the Egyptians on behalf of the French Republic, "founded on the basis of freedom and equality" (*ʿalā asās al-ḥurriyya wa'l-taswiya*: versions in Djabartī, *Muẓhir al-taḳdīs*, Cairo n.d., i, 37; Niḳūlā al-Turk, *Mudhakkirāt*, ed G. Wiet, Cairo 1950, 8; the text also appears in Djabartī, *ʿAdjāʾib*, iii, Cairo 1879, 4; Ḥaydar al-Shihābī's *Lubnān*, etc.). The word used for freedom is *ḥurriyya*, which, however, was still far from being a commonly accepted equivalent to the European term in its political sense. Ruphy's French-Arabic wordlist, printed in 1802, renders *liberté* by *ḥurriyya*, but with the restriction "opposé à l'esclavage"; in the sense of "pouvoir d'agir" he prefers *sarāḥ* (J. F. Ruphy, *Dictionnaire abrégé français-arabe*, Paris, An X [1802], 120). As late as 1841 the Phanariot Handjeri renders "liberté civile" and "liberté politique" by *rukhṣat-i sherʿiyye* and *rukhṣat-i mülkiyye* respectively (*Dictionnaire français-arabe-persan et turc*, ii, Moscow 1840-1, 397, with explanations and examples).

Early references to freedom in works of Muslim authorship are hostile, and equate it with libertinism, licentiousness, and anarchy. A significant change can, however, be seen in a passage in the chronicle of Shānizāde ([*q.v.*] d. 1826) under the year 1230/1815, discussing the nature of council meetings (*keyfiyyet-i medjālis-i meshweret*), which became frequent at this time. Shānizāde is careful to base the holding of such consultations on Islamic precedent and ancient Ottoman practice, and to give warning against its misuse; at the same time he points out that such consultations are normally held, with beneficial effects, in "certain well-organized states (*düwel-i muntaẓama*)"—a striking euphemism for the states of Europe—and attributes to the members attending the councils a representative quality entirely new to Islamic political thought. The members of the councils consist of two groups, servants of the state and representatives of the subjects (*wükelā-i raʿiyyet*); they discuss and argue freely (*ber wedjh-i serbestiyyet*) and thus arrive at a decision (Shānizāde, *Taʾrīḫ*, iv, Istanbul 1291, 2-3; cf. B. Lewis, in *BSOAS*, xxix (1966), 385-6).

In the decades that followed, the notion of political freedom became more familiar through discussions of European affairs and translations of European works (*e.g.* the Turkish version of Botta's *Storia d'Italia*, Cairo 1249/1834, repr. Istanbul 1293/1876, which abounds in references to liberal principles and institutions). It was also discussed and developed by several Muslim writers, who were influenced more especially by the rather conservative constitutionalism of the post-Napoleonic era—the idea of the *Rechtsstaat*, or state based on the rule of law, in contrast both to the unbridled absolutism of Napoleon and the licence of the Revolution. One of the most important of these was the Egyptian Shaykh Rifāʿa Rāfiʿ al-Ṭahṭāwī [*q.v.*], who lived in Paris from 1826 to 1831. His account of what he saw and learnt was first published in Būlāḳ in Arabic in 1834 and in a Turkish version in 1839; it includes a translation with commentary of the French constitution and a description of parliamentary institutions, the purpose of which is to secure government under law and the protection of the subject from tyranny. What the French call freedom (*ḥurriyya*), says Shaykh Rifāʿa, is the same as what the Muslims call justice and equity (*al-ʿadl wa'l-inṣāf*)—that is, the maintenance of equality before the law, government according to law, and the abstention of the ruler from arbitrary and illegal acts against the subject (*Takhlīṣ al-ibrīz fī talkhīṣ Bārīz*, ed. Mahdī ʿAllām, Aḥmad Badawī and Anwar Lūḳā, Cairo n.d. [1958 *?*], 148). Shaykh Rifāʿa's equation of *ḥurriyya* with the classical Islamic concept of justice [see ʿADL, INṢĀF and ẒULM] helped to relate the new to the old concepts, and fit his own political writings into the long line of Muslim exhortations to the sovereign to rule wisely and justly, with due respect for the law and due care for the interests and welfare of the subjects [see RAʿIYYA and SIYĀSA]. What is new and alien to traditional political ideas is the suggestion that the subject has a *right* to be treated justly, and that some apparatus should be set up to secure that right. With remarkable percipience, Shaykh Rifāʿa sees and explains the different rôles of parliament, the courts and the press in protecting the subjects from tyranny—or rather, as he points out, in enabling the subjects to protect themselves. What is far from clear is the extent to which he felt these ideas and institutions to be relevant to the needs of his own country. In his later writings there is little suggestion of any such relevance; even his commendation of the Khedive Ismāʿīl for setting up a consultative assembly in 1866 shows a traditional concern with the duties of the ruler—justice and consultation—rather than a liberal concern with the rights of the ruled. In his *al-Murshid al-amīn* (Cairo 1862, 127 ff.), he defines freedom under five sub-headings, the last

two of which are civic (*madanī*) and political (*siyāsī*). Both are defined in relation to social, economic and legal rights, without any specific reference to *political* rights in the liberal sense. The first three sub-headings are natural, social (*i.e.*, freedom of 'conduct') and religious. Political freedom is the assurance of the state to the individual of the enjoyment of his property and the exercise of his 'natural' freedom (*i.e.*, the basic innate power of all living creatures to eat, drink, move etc., limited by the need to avoid injury to himself or to others) (see L. Zolondek, *Al-Ṭahṭāwī and political freedom*, in *MW*, liv (1964), 90-7.)

Shaykh Rifāʿa's Turkish contemporary Ṣādiḳ Rifʿat Pasha [*q.v.*], though vaguer in his theoretical notions of the meaning of freedom, is more specific on its immediate application at home. In an essay first drafted while he was Ottoman ambassador in Vienna in 1837—and in close touch with Metternich—he discusses the essential differences between Turkey and Europe, and those respects in which Turkey might profitably seek to imitate Europe. Ṣādiḳ Rifʿat is deeply impressed by European wealth, industry and science, in which he sees the best means of regenerating Turkey. European progress and prosperity, he explains, are the result of certain political conditions, of stability and tranquillity, which in turn depend on 'the attainment of complete security for the life, property, honour and reputation of each nation and people, that is to say, on the proper application of the necessary rights of freedom (*ḥuḳūḳ-i lāzime-i ḥürriyyet*)'. For Ṣādiḳ Rifʿat, as for Shaykh Rifāʿa, freedom is an extension of the classical Islamic idea of justice—an obligation of the ruler to act justly and in accordance with the law; but it is also one of the "*rights* of the nation" (*ḥuḳūḳ-i millet*), and the establishment of these rights in Turkey is a matter of "the most urgent necessity" (text in Ṣādiḳ Rifʿat Paşha, *Müntekhabāt-i āthār*, Istanbul, *Awrupanlıñ aḥwāline dā'ir .. risāle*, 4; cf. ibid., *Idāre-i hukümetiñ baʿḍ-ı ḳawāʿid-i esāsiyyesini mutaḍammin .. risāle, passim*; another version in ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Sheref, *Taʾrīkh muṣāḥabeleri*, Istanbul 1340, 125 f.). Similar ideas are expressed by another Turkish writer, Muṣṭafā Sāmī, a former Embassy secretary in Paris, who in an essay published in 1840 speaks with admiration of the political and religious liberties of the French. Such ideas find official expression in the first of the great reforming edicts—the ferman of the Rose-chamber (*Gülḫāne*) of 1839, which recognizes and seeks to establish the rights of the subject to security of life, honour and property, and to government under law. There are two specific references to freedom—in the clause guaranteeing that "everyone shall dispose of his property in all freedom (*serbestiyyet*)", and in the clause concerning the Councils, in which everyone present "shall express his ideas and observations freely (*serbestče*) and without hesitation." (Text in *Düstūr*, first series, i, 4-7; in modern script, in A. Şeref Gözübüyük and S. Kili, *Türk anayasa metinleri*, Ankara 1957, 3-5; English trans. in Hurewitz, i, 113-6).

These ideas of freedom are still very cautious and conservative; one would expect no other from Shaykh Rifāʿa, the loyal servant of the rulers of Egypt, or from Ṣādiḳ Rifʿat, the disciple of Metternich and coadjutor of Reshīd Pasha [*q.v.*]. The subjects were to be treated justly by the government; Indeed, they had a right to be treated justly, and laws should be promulgated to secure such treatment. But there is still no idea that the subjects have any right to share in the formation or conduct of government—to political freedom, or citizenship, in the sense which underlies the development of liberal political thought in the West.

While conservative reformers talked of freedom under law, and some Muslim monarchs even experimented with councils and assemblies [see DUSTŪR, MADJLIS, MASHWARA], government was in fact becoming more and not less arbitrary and oppressive. The modernization of government and the abrogation of intermediate powers at once strengthened the autocracy of the state, and removed or weakened the traditional limitations on its functioning. More authoritarian government provoked more radical criticism; the newly created and rapidly expanding press [see DJARĪDA] provided a medium for its expression; 19th century Europe offered a wide range of inspiration and example.

The suggestion has been made that some of the Lebanese movements of the periods 1820-1 and 1840 may have been inspired or influenced by French Revolutionary ideologies of national liberation and political democracy. The documents on which these suggestions rest (Philippe and Farīd Khāzin, *Madjmūʿat al-muḥarrarāt al-siyāsiyya wa'l-mufāwaḍāt al-duwaliyya ʿan Sūriyya wa-Lubnān*, i, Djūniya 1910, 1 ff.) are few and uncertain, and may reflect the activities of French agitators more than any genuine local movement. A more definite expression of libertarian ideas occurs in an account of the revolt of the Maronites of Kisrawān in 1858-9, led by Ṭanyūs Shāhīn [*q.v.*]; he is said to have aimed at "republican government" (*ḥukūma djumhūriyya*), probably meaning some form of representative government (Anṭūn al-ʿAḳīḳī, ed. Yūsuf Ibrāhīm Yazbak, *Thawra wa-fitna fī Lubnān*, Damascus 1938, 87; English trans. M. H. Kerr, *Lebanon in the last years of feudalism . . .*, Beirut 1959, 53. See further P. K. Hitti, *The impact of the West on Syria and Lebanon in the nineteenth century*, in *J.Wld.Hist.*, ii (1955), 629-30).

The intensification of Western influence during and after the Crimean War on the one hand, and the growing internal political and economic pressures on the other, both helped to bring a revival of libertarian thought and activities in the eighteen sixties. In Turkey, Shināsī [*q.v.*] stressed the importance of freedom of expression in the introductory editorials both of *Terdjumān-i Aḥwāl* (no. 1, 1277/1860) and of *Taṣwīr-i Efkār* (no. 1, 15 June [O.S.] 1278/1862). In Syria, the Christian author Francis Fatḥ Allāh al-Marrāsh [*q.v.*] wrote an allegorical dialogue (*Ghābat al-ḥaḳḳ*, Beirut 1866, repr. Cairo 1298/1880-1), which includes a philosophic and political discussion of freedom, and of the conditions that are required to maintain it. More directly political in content was the work of a Muslim author, the famous Khayr al-Dīn Pasha [*q.v.*], one of the authors of the Tunisian constitutional enactment of 1861 (*Aḳwām al-masālik fī maʿrifat aḥwāl al-mamālik*, Tunis 1284-5/1867-8; French trans. *Réformes nécessaires aux états musulmans*, Paris 1868; Turkish version, Istanbul 1296/1879). In this rather conservative programme of reform, Khayr al-Dīn examines the sources of European wealth and power, and finds them in the political institutions of Europe, which secure justice and freedom. Identifying the two, he makes some cautious and rather obscure recommendations on how to secure them in the Islamic state without violating or departing from Islamic traditions and institutions, by reliance on 'consultation' [see MASHWARA], since the consultation of ministers,

ʿulamāʾ, and notables is the authentic Islamic equivalent of the European system of representative and constitutional government. It may be noted that neither as chief minister in Tunisia in the years 1873-7, nor as Grand Vizier in Turkey in 1878-9, did he do anything to restore the constitutions which had been suspended in both countries.

Already in 1856, in an ode addressed to Reshīd Pasha on the occasion of the Reform Edict of that year, Shināsī tells the reforming Pasha "You have made us free (*āzād*), who were slaves to oppression (*ẓulm*)" and continues: "Your law is an act of manumission (*ʿitḳnāme*) for men, your law informs the Sultan of his limits (*bildirir ḥaddini*)."

The radical implications of these words—the replacement of justice by freedom as the antithesis of tyranny, and the suggestion of a constitutional restriction of the sovereign's powers—were developed and made clear in the late sixties and seventies by the group of liberal patriots known as the Young (strictly "new") Ottomans [see YEŃI ʿOTHMĀNLĪLAR]. The political ideas of the Young Ottomans, though couched in Islamic terms and related, sometimes with visible effort, to Islamic traditions, are of European origin, and express an Ottoman-Islamic adaptation of the liberal patriotism current in Europe at that time. Their ideal was the British parliament at Westminster, their ideology was drawn from the liberal teachings of the French enlightenment and revolution, their organization and tactics were modelled on the patriotic secret societies of Italy and Poland. In the political writings of the Young Ottomans the two key words are *Waṭan* [*q.v.*]—fatherland, and *Ḥürriyyet*—freedom. The latter was the name of the weekly journal which they published in exile (London, June 1868-April 1870; Geneva, April-June 1870). In this journal, and in other writings, the Young Ottoman ideologists, above all Nāmiḳ Kemāl [*q.v.*], expounded their interpretation of liberty—the sovereignty of the people, to be secured by constitutional and representative government (see for example the article from *Ḥürriyyet* published by M. Colombe in French translation in *Orient*, no. 13 (1960), 123-33). For Kemāl as for earlier Muslim writers, the primary duty of the state is still to act justly—but justice means not only care for the welfare of the subject, but respect for his political rights. These rights must be safeguarded by appropriate institutions: "To keep the government within the limits of justice, there are two basic devices. The first of them is that the fundamental rules by which it operates should no longer be implicit or tacit, but should be published to the world . . . The second principle is consultation (*meshweret*), whereby the legislative power is taken away from the government" (Nāmiḳ Kemāl, *Ḥuḳūḳ-i ʿumūmiyye*, in *ʿIbret*, no. 18, 1872; repr. in Ebü'l-Ḍiyā Tewfīḳ, *Nümūne-i edebiyyāt-i ʿOṯmāniyye*[3], Istanbul 1306, 357-8, and, in the new Turkish script, in Mustafa N. Özön, *Namık Kemal ve Ibret gazetesi*, Istanbul 1938, 96-7; English trans. in Lewis, *Emergence*, 140). Like his predecessors, Nāmiḳ Kemāl tries to present these imported ideas as natural developments from traditional Islamic notions; in this way justice grows into freedom and consultation into representation. Thus far, Nāmiḳ Kemāl and his associates had been anticipated by earlier 19th century writers, and even to some extent by rulers, who had summoned councils and issued edicts [see DUSTŪR, MAḎLIS, MAŠWARA]. But the Young Ottomans, both in thought and actions, went far beyond their cautious forerunners. For Nāmiḳ Kemāl, a consultative assembly, even an elected one, is not enough. The essence of the matter is that this assembly be the exclusive possessor of the legislative power, of which the government would thus be deprived. This doctrine of the separation of powers, to be expressed in and maintained by a written constitution, is supported by the even more radical idea of the sovereignty of the people, which Nāmiḳ Kemāl identifies with the classical *bayʿa* [*q.v.*]. "The sovereignty of the people (*ḥākimiyyet-i aḥālī*), which means that the powers of the government derive from the people, and which in the language of the *Sharīʿa* is called *bayʿa* . . . is a right necessarily arising from the personal independence (*istiḳlāl-i ḏhātī*) that each individual by nature possesses." (Nāmiḳ Kemāl, *Ḥuḳūḳ-i ʿumūmiyye*, loc. cit.). He was not deceived by the apparently liberal and constitutional aspects of the *Tanẓīmāt* [*q.v.*]. The reform edict of 1839 was not, as some had claimed, a fundamental constitutional charter (*Sharṭnāme-i esāsī*), but a measure of administrative westernization. "Had the Rescript not confined the general precepts of law set forth in its preamble to personal freedom (*ḥürriyyet-i shakhṣiyye*) alone, which it interpreted as security of life, property and honour, but also proclaimed such other basic principles as freedom of thought (*ḥürriyyet-i efkār*), sovereignty of the people, and the system of government by consultation [*i.e.*, representative and responsible government], then only could it have taken the character of a fundamental charter . . ." (*ʿIbret* no. 46, 1872, cit. Ihsan Sungu, *Tanzimat ve Yeni Osmanlılar*, in *Tanzimat*, i, Istanbul 1940, 845; English trans. in Lewis, *Emergence*, 167).

In 1876, with the promulgation of the first Ottoman constitution, the liberal and parliamentary programme of the Young Ottomans seemed to be on the point of realization. Article 10 of the constitution lays down that personal freedom is inviolable, and subsequent articles deal with freedom of worship, the press, association, education, etc., as well as with freedom from arbitrary violations of the rights of the person, residence and property. In its political provisions, however, the constitution is less libertarian. It derives not from the sovereignty of the people but from the will of the sovereign, who retains important prerogatives and all residual powers; it gives only perfunctory recognition to the principle of the separation of powers. Its effective life was in any case brief. In February 1878 parliament was dissolved; it did not meet again for thirty years.

Under ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd freedom was a proscribed word, and the ideals which it connoted became all the more precious. For Turkish modernists of that generation, the fountainhead was the West, which provided both material examples of the benefits of freedom, and intellectual guidance on the means of attaining it. "When you look upon this fascinating display of human progress", wrote Saʿdullāh from the Paris Exhibition of 1878, "do not forget that all these achievements are the work of freedom. It is under the protection of freedom that peoples and nations attain happiness. Without freedom, there can be no security; without security, no endeavour; without endeavour, no prosperity; without prosperity no happiness . . ." (Saʿdullāh Pasha, *1878 Paris Ekspozisyonu*, in Ebü'l-Ḍiyā Tewfīḳ, *Nümūne . . .*, 288; English trans. in B. Lewis, *Middle East . . .*, 47). As an earlier generation had turned to Voltaire, Rousseau and Montesquieu, so the new generation read the writings of Haeckel, Büchner, Le Bon (specially favoured because of his sympathy for Islam), Spencer, Mill and many others. "If there

are today", wrote Ḥüseyn Raḥmī in 1908, "men who can think, can write, and can defend freedom, they are those whose minds were enlightened by these sparks [of European culture]. In those dark and melancholy days, our friends, our guides were those intellectual treasures of the West. We learned the love for thinking, the love for freedom, from those treasures" (Preface to *Shipsevdi*, Istanbul 1912, English trans. in Niyazi Berkes, *Secularism*, 292). In more practical political terms, freedom meant constitutional and representative government—the ending of autocracy, the restoration of the constitution, and the safeguarding of the rights of the citizen by free elections and parliaments. But freedom was no longer a purely political matter. For some, the exponents of materialist and secularist ideas, it involved an intellectual liberation from what they saw as the shackles of religious obscurantism. Perhaps the first to conceive of liberation in social and economic terms was Prince Ṣabāḥ al-Dīn [*q.v.*], who sought to lead Turkey from a collectivist to an individualist social order by a policy of federalism and decentralization and by the encouragement of private enterprise. In 1902 he founded a society dedicated to the achievement of these purposes. Similar ideas inspired the Liberal Entente (*Ḥürriyyet we I'tilāf* [*q.v.*]), which appeared in 1911 as a rival to the Union and Progress Party [see ITTIḤĀD WE TERAḲḲĪ]. An interesting example of the use of the word in a social and individualist connotation is in Ḳāsim Amin's [*q.v.*] famous book *Taḥrīr al-mar'a*, the liberation—*i.e.*, emancipation—of woman (Cairo 1316/1898 and 1905; Turkish versions: Cairo 1326/1908, Istanbul 1329/1911, and, in Northern Turkish, Kazan 1909).

After the revolution of 1908 the establishment, for a while, of effective freedom of thought and expression initiated a period of vigorous discussion, in which the problem of freedom, with others, was examined, analysed, and discussed from many points of view; political, social, economic and religious freedom all find their exponents and defenders. But as the bonds of autocracy and censorship were wound tighter by the Young Turks, the debate dwindled into insignificance. In the new Turkey that emerged under the first and second republics, the discussion of freedom does not differ significantly from that of Europe, and need not be considered here.

Ottoman subjects from the Arab lands played a certain rôle in the libertarian movement almost from the beginning. On 24 March 1867, the Egyptian prince Muṣṭafā Fāḍil Pasha [*q.v.*] published in the French newspaper *Liberté* an open letter to the Sultan, advising him to grant a constitution to the Empire (reprinted in *Orient*, no. 5 (1958), 29-38). Besides endowing them with their first manifesto, the Pasha also helped the Young Ottoman exiles financially, and was later succeeded in this by his brother the Khedive Ismā'īl, who saw in them a useful instrument of his political purposes. In Hamidian times, one of the first libertarian journals published in exile was started by Salīm Fāris, a son of Aḥmad Fāris al-Shidyāḳ [*q.v.*]. Published in London in January 1894, it was entitled *Ḥürriyyet*—a significant evocation of the earlier Young Ottoman weekly. He was later induced by agents of the Sultan to cease publication. Other exiles included the Lebanese *amīr* Amīn Arslān, who published an Arabic journal called *Kashf al-Niḳāb* in Paris in 1895, and a former Syrian deputy in the Ottoman parliament of 1876, Khalīl Ghānim [*q.v.*], who became active in Young Turk circles. The ideas and arguments of the Young Ottomans and of the Young Turks found their echoes also in Arabic publications, which at this period tend to offer a provincial adaptation of ideas circulating among the Turkish ruling groups. Thus, the much discussed appearance of the motto *Ḥubb al-waṭan min al-īmān*—"love of country is part of the faith"—on the Syrian fortnightly *Al-Djinān* in 1870 follows its regular use in the Young Ottoman weekly *Ḥürriyyet* from 1868 to 1870; the growth of federalist groups among the Ottoman Arabs must be related to the federalist movement among the Turks.

In Egypt, under Khedivial and then British rule, political thought evolved along different lines, more directly influenced by Europe, and less directly affected by events and movements in the Ottoman Empire—though even here these had their effect. Many of the leaders of thought were Arabic-speaking emigrés from the Ottoman lands; the occasional presence and activity in Egypt of such Turkish personalities as Prince Ṣabāḥ al-Dīn and 'Abd Allāh Djewdet [*q.v.*] cannot have passed unnoticed. Walī al-Dīn Yakan [*q.v.*], of Turkish origin and a participant in Young Turk politics, wrote extensively in Arabic on political and social problems. A work of some influence was Djewdet's Turkish translation of Vittorio Alfieri's *Della tirannide*. Entitled simply *Istibdād*, it was first printed in Geneva in 1898 and reprinted in Cairo in 1909. This translation appears to underlie the famous Arabic adaptation of Alfieri's book by the Aleppine exile in Egypt, 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Kawākibī [*q.v.*], entitled *Ṭabā'i' al-istibdād*, Cairo n.d. (Sylvia G. Haim, *Alfieri and al-Kawākibī*, in *OM*, xxxiv (1954), 321-34; E. Rossi, *Una traduzione turca dell'opera "Della Tirannide" di V. Alfieri*, *ibid.*, 335-7).

One of the earliest discussions of freedom—little noticed at the time—in Egypt, after Shaykh Rifā'a (see above) is that of the Azharī Shaykh Ḥusayn al-Marṣafī. In his *Risālat al-kalim al-thamān*—"Essay on eight words", published in Cairo in 1298/1881, he examines and interprets, for the benefit of "the intelligent young men of these times", eight political terms "current on the tongues of men" (p. 2). One of them is *ḥurriyya* (pp. 36-7), which the Shaykh explains in natural and social terms—the difference between men and beasts, the human habit of social specialization and association, and hence the need for social cooperation and the mutual recognition of rights. The Shaykh recognizes the necessity of freedom in this natural and social sense, but rather obscurely warns his young readers against untoward extensions of the concept into the realm of politics.

Despite such warnings, the influence of European liberal political thought continued to grow, and found frequent expression in Arabic as well as Turkish writings. The merits of freedom are variously presented and defended. For some, a vaguely understood freedom is still the secret talisman of Western prosperity and power; its adoption is therefore desirable in order to achieve the same results. For others, freedom means the overthrow of tyranny, usually identified with Sultan 'Abd al-Ḥamīd, and the establishment of a constitutional régime in its place. Perhaps the last and most cogent exposition of the classical liberal position in Arabic is that of the Egyptian Aḥmad Luṭfī al-Sayyid (1872-1963). A declared disciple of J. S. Mill and other 19th century liberals, Luṭfī al-Sayyid gives a central position to the problem of liberty in his political thought. Freedom, basically, means the rights of the individual—his inalienable natural freedom,

defined and safeguarded by civil rights, which in turn are secured by political and legal arrangements and institutions. The action and interference of the State must be kept at the minimum; the freedom of the individual and of the nation must be secured by a free press, an independent judiciary, and a constitutional régime guaranteeing the separation of powers.

Luṭfi al-Sayyid is concerned not only with the freedom of the individual, but also with that of the nation, which has corporate natural rights distinct from and additional to the aggregate of the rights of the individuals composing it. Rejecting pan-Islamism and disapproving of Arab nationalism, he sees the nation as Egypt, and argues for her liberation from both foreign rule and native authoritarianism.

The liberal interpretation of freedom continued to find exponents, particularly after the Young Turk revolution of 1908 and again after the military victory of the democracies ten years later. But in the meantime a new interpretation of freedom was gaining ground, resulting from the spread of imperialism and the rise of nationalism. In nationalist usage, freedom is a synonym for independence—the sovereignty of the nation state, untrammeled by any superior, alien authority. In the absence of any such subordination to aliens, a nation is called free, irrespective of the political, social and economic conditions prevailing within it. This interpretation of freedom had less impact among the Turks, whose independence, though threatened, was never lost, than among the Arab peoples for whom the main theme of political life was the ending of alien rule. During the period of British and French domination, individual freedom was never much of an issue. Though often limited and sometimes suspended, it was on the whole more extensive and better protected than either before or after. The imperial régimes conceded freedom but withheld independence; it was natural that the anti-imperialist struggle should concentrate on the latter and neglect the former. In the final revulsion against the West, Western democracy too was rejected as a fraud and a delusion, of no value to Muslims. The words liberty (*ḥurriyya*) and liberation (*taḥrīr*) retained their magic, but were emptied of that liberal individualist content which had first attracted Muslim attention in the 19th century. A few voices still spoke of personal, individual rights, and some writers used a word from the same root, *taḥarrur*, to denote psychological self-liberation, or emancipation (from the shackles of tradition etc.). But for most users of the word freedom was a collective, not an individual attribute; it was first interpreted politically, as independence, and then, when this by itself proved inadequate, reinterpreted in quasi-economic terms, as the absence of private or foreign exploitation.

On nationalism, see ḲAWMIYYA; on independence, ISTIḲLĀL; on socialism, IŠHTIRĀKIYYA; on communism, ŠUYŪ'IYYA; on autocracy, ISTIBDĀD; on tyranny ẒULM.

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(b) Arab lands: the pioneer work on modern Arab political thought is the much-used and insufficiently acknowledged anthology of Ra'if al-Khūri, *al-Fikr al-'Arabī al-ḥadīth*, Beirut 1943, a collection of excerpts, with an introduction, illustrating the influence on Arab thought of the French Revolution. The subject of freedom is discussed in a number of works on nationalism and related topics: H. Z. Nuseibeh, *The ideas of Arab nationalism*, Ithaca N.Y., 1956; J. M. Ahmed, *The intellectual origins of Egyptian nationalism*, London 1960; N. Safran, *Egypt in search of political community*, Cambridge Mass. 1961; Sylvia G. Haim, *Arab nationalism*, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1962; Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, *The Arab rediscovery of Europe*, Princeton N.J., 1963. Arab liberalism receives special attention in A. Hourani, *Arabic thought in the liberal age 1798-1939*, London 1962.

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ḤÜRRIYET WE I'TILĀF FİRḲASİ ("Freedom and Accord Party"), also known as *Entente Libérale* ("Liberal Union"), Ottoman political party, formed on 21 November 1911. It succeeded a number of other liberal-conservative political parties formed after the 1908 revolution in opposition to the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) [see ITTIḤĀD WE TERAḲḲĪ DJEM'IYETI], including the *'Oṯmānlī Aḥrār Fırḳası* (1908), the *Mu'tedil Ḥürriyetperverān Fırḳası* (1909), the *Ahālī Fırḳası* (1910), and the *Ḥizb-i Djedīd* (1911). It advocated a policy of administrative decentralization, opposition to radical social reform, and a *laissez-faire* economy as opposed to state intervention. In the Chamber of Deputies the Liberal Union rallied all those who had belonged to the *Ahālī Fırḳası* as well as dissidents from the CUP.

The party was founded during the Turco-Italian war, when Unionist prestige was low. As in the past, personalities such as Dāmād Ferīd, Kāmil Pasha and Prince Ṣabāḥ al-Dīn continued to provide leadership and inspiration. The success of Ṭāhir Khayr al-Dīn, the Liberal candidate, in the Istanbul by-election on 11 December 1911 seemed to suggest that the tide had turned in favour of the Liberals (*Yeñi Iḳdām*, 12 Dec. 1911; and the memoirs of Cavit (Djāwid [*q.v.*]) in *Tanin*, 30 Oct. 1943). Liberal hopes were dashed in the 1912 elections, which the Unionists manipulated ruthlessly, and this led the Liberals to turn to unconstitutional means to assume power.